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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
: OPENING BRIEF 
Plaintiff and Appellee, OF APPELLANT 
v, 
DARRYL HUBBARD, Case No. 20000233-SC 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction for a first degree or 
capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant the use of an 
expert witness to assist the jury in understanding the eyewitness identification testimony. 
Standard of Review: "The admission or exclusion of evidence is for 
the trial court to determine as an initial matter, and its judgment will be 
overturned only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Finlayson 956 
P.2d283,291 (UtahApp. 1998), quoting State v. Miller 727 P.2d203, 
205 (Utah, 1986). 
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This issue was preserved for appeal by way of Appellant's Notice of Intent to Rely 
on Expert Testimony filed with the Third District Judicial Court August 16, 1999, which 
included the curriculum vitae of Hubbard's proposed expert witness, Dr. David H. Dodd. 
(R. 64-71) Appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert 
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification on August 31, 1999. (R. 82-94) A hearing was 
held on the matter before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder on September 2, 1999. (R. 240) 
Judge Hilder entered an Order denying Defendant's Motion on September 28, 1999. (R. 
132-135)(See Addendum B) 
II. Whether the introduction of the eyewitness identification violated Appellant's right 
to due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Standard of Review: The court on appeal reviews the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. 
It reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on the facts 
under a correctness standard. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 
(Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991)). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Appellant's filing of his Motion to 
Suppress Eyewitness Identification on June 2, 1999 in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(R. 43-45) A hearing on the Motion was held July 9, 1999 before the Honorable Judge 
Robert K. Hilder. (R. 228) The Judge entered an Order denying Hubbard's Motion on 
August 16, 1999. (R. 62) 
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III. Whether the trial court erred by conducting individual voir dire of prospective 
jurors at side bar, outside the defendant's presence and off the record. 
Standard of Review: Appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
Although this issue was not raised before the trial court, this Court should consider 
this issue on appeal because the trial court committed plain error. State v. Harrison, 
P.3d , (slip opinion at paragraph 15) (Utah, 2001). See also. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d, 1201, 108-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules and regulations are contained in Addendum A. 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV 
Utah State Const. Art. I, Section 7 
Utah State Const. Art. I, Section 12 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1953) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On February 18, 1999, Appellant was charged by Information with Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1994); 
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Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 
(1989); Aggravated Assault (relating to Jeff Gunderson), a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); Theft, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973); Possession of a Dangerous Weapon By a 
Restricted Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(2)(a) (1997); and Aggravated Assault (relating to Cheryl Moss), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). (R. 22-25) 
At a preliminary hearing held May 11, 1999, the trial court found that the State 
did not produce evidence to a probable cause standard sufficient to bind Appellant over 
on the charges of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and the third 
degree felony Aggravated Assault, (relating to Cheryl Moss). (R. 227 at 63) Appellant 
was bound over on the remaining counts. (Id.) 
An evidentiary hearing on Appellant's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony was held July 9, 1999. (R. 228) At the hearing, Detective Karl 
Merino testified as to the procedures he followed in presenting the photo lineup to 
witnesses Gunderson and Moss. (R. 228 at 5-51) Appellant argued that the photo lineup 
was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable. (R. 228 at 53-54) The trial court denied 
Appellant's motion, finding that the photo lineup was reliable and not impermissibly 
suggestive. (R. 228 at 57) 
A hearing on Appellant's Motion to Allow Eyewitness Expert Testimony was held 
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September 2, 1999. (R. 240) Appellant argued that the court should allow the expert 
testimony of Dr. David Dodd regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification 
testimony. (R. 240 at 4-17) The trial court denied Appellant's motion, finding that such 
testimony was neither required nor advisable. (R. 132-135) Specifically, the court found 
that education of the jury was a judicial function, best accomplished by instruction rather 
than by an expert. (Id.) In addition, the court found that allowing an expert witness to 
testify on the subject of the reliability of eyewitness testimony wold tend to cause the jury 
to abdicate its role as fact finder. (Id.) 
A jury trial was held January 18-19, 2000. (R. 229-230). The jury convicted 
Appellant of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1994), Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-203 (1989), and Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). (R. 191-194, 230 at 276) 
Appellant was sentenced March 6, 2000 to an indeterminate term of five years to 
life on the two first degree felonies and an indeterminate term of zero to five years on the 
third degree felony, all charges to run concurrent. (R. 199-201) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of January 24, 1999, Jeff Gunderson ("Gunderson") and a few 
friends were at his apartment smoking marijuana when Gunderson answered a knock at 
his door by someone identifying himself as "Six Nine." (R. 229 at 129, 131) When 
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Gunderson attempted to stop the person from entering his apartment, the person shot 
Gunderson in the leg. (R. 229 at 132) The person then entered Gunderson's apartment, 
pointed the gun at Gunderson, and demanded drugs, money and guns from the two safes 
located inside the apartment. (R. 229 at 133) 
Gunderson opened the first safe and the person took the small amount of money 
and marijuana stashed inside of it. (R. 229 at 138) The person also took a larger amount 
of money from Gunderson's wallet as well as his pistol grip Mossberg shotgun. (R. 229 at 
137-38) The person then took Gunderson back to the bedroom to open the second safe. 
(R. 229 at 139) The person instructed Gunderson to wait in the bedroom. (Id.) Without 
taking anything from the second safe, the person then fled from the apartment. (Id.) 
Also present in the apartment during the robbery were Gunderson's live-in 
girlfriend, Cheryl Moss, ("Moss") and three of Gunderson's male friends: Travis Pearson, 
Michael Martin, and Ayza Wells. (R. 229 at 80, R. 227 at 21-22) 
Gunderson gave a description of the assailant to an officer arriving at his 
residence approximately one-half hour following the robbery. (R. 227 at 28-29R. 229 at 
141) Gunderson may have also given a description of the assailant to detectives who 
spoke with him while he was recovering in the hospital. (R. 227 at 29) Gunderson's 
described the assailant as being "very tall" (R. 227 at 29), "approximately six foot nine, if 
not larger." (R. 227 at 14); as a black male with a medium to light complexion (R. 227 at 
29); strong (R. 227 at 30); having a goatee (Id-); wearing a baggy dark coat and a black 
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or dark blue "beanie" stocking cap rolled down to approximately one inch above his 
eyebrow, and calling himself "Six Nine." (R. 227 at 30-31). 
Moss gave her first description of the assailant to the police when they responded 
to the residence she shared with Gunderson. (R. 227 at 47) Moss gave another description 
of the assailant to an officer later in the evening at LDS hospital where Gunderson was 
being treated for his wound. (R. 227 at 48) She described the assailant as wearing a green 
and black Nike jacket, Levi's, and a black ski cap. (Id.) Moss returned to the apartment 
that evening to obtain some clothing. (R. 229 at 96, R. 227 at 46) While there, the 
upstairs neighbors came downstairs to talk with her. (Id.) They informed her that they 
knew and "hung out" with a person who went by the nickname "Six Nine." (R. 229 at 97) 
Moss contacted Detective Karl Merino ("Merino"), the detective assigned to investigate 
the robbery, and gave him this information. (R. 229 at 97) 
After receiving the information that the suspect went by the nickname of "Six 
Nine", Merino contacted the Salt Lake County Sheriffs department and asked them if 
they knew of anyone who used that nickname. (R. 228 at 10; R. 229 at 166) The 
Sheriffs department then supplied Merino with a photograph, a mug shot, of Appellant. 
(Id.) Believing that the mug shot matched the description of the assailant given to him by 
Gunderson, Merino assembled a photo lineup. (R. 228 at 11; R. 229 at 168) Merino went 
to Gunderson's house on February 15, 1999, to show him the photo lineup. (R. 229 at 
164) Gunderson, Moss and another individual met Merino in the back parking area 
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belonging to their apartment. (R. 229 at 168) Merino first showed the photo array to 
Gunderson, and Gunderson identified Appellant as the perpetrator. (R. 229 at 143-144, 
170) Moss said she was standing about ten feet from Gunderson during this time. (R. 229 
at 99) Moss heard Gunderson say "That's him," and T m ten on the scale," when Merino 
showed Gunderson the photos. (Id.) Merino then gave the photos to Moss to review. (R. 
229 at 171). Merino stated that Moss was forty or fifty feet away when he had conducted 
the photo line up with Gunderson. (R. 228 at 19, R. 229 at 173) Moss also picked 
Appellant as the perpetrator. (R. 229 at 98, 171) 
Following these identifications, the State of Utah filed an Information charging 
Appellant with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1994); Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-203 (1989); Aggravated Assault (relating to Jeff Gunderson), a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); Theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973); Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon By a Restricted Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503(2)(a) (1997); and Aggravated Assault (relating to Cheryl Moss), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). (R. 22-25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant's only available defense at trial centered on the question of the identity 
of the robber. The State presented no other evidence linking Appellant to the crimes. 
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Additionally, Appellant presented an alibi defense. In order to educate the jury on th§ 
inherent dangers and fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony, Appellant asked 
the trial court to allow expert testimony on the matter. The trial court denied Appellant's 
request, violating Appellant's due process rights and his right to present a defense. 
The trial court also denied Appellant his rights of due process under both the Utah 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution when it denied his motion to suppress the photo 
array identifications and subsequent in-court identifications. The witnesses' identification 
of Appellant as the robber were unreliable, and should not have been admitted. Further, 
the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, making the subsequent in-court 
identifications unreliable and inadmissible. 
Appellant has a fundamental right, guaranteed statutorily and constitutionally, [to 
be present at every stage of the criminal proceedings against him. This right belongs 
solely to the defendant, and may only be waived freely and knowingly. Appellant did not 
waive this privilege, yet the trial court engaged in many instances of private discussions 
with prospective jurors at the bench, outside Appellant's presence. Such conduct by the 
trial court constituted reversible error, requiring this Court to remand these proceedings 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DESICRETION IN 
DENYING APPELLANT THE USE OF AN EXPERT WITNESS TO 
ASSIST THE JURY IN UNDERSTANDING THE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
Appellant filed a M Notice of Intent to Rely on Expert Testimony with the Third 
District Judicial Court August 16, 1999, which included the curriculum vitae of 
Appellant's proposed expert witness, Dr. David H. Dodd. (R. 64-71) The curriculum 
vitae noted that Dr. Dodd, a psychology professor at the University of Utah, specializes in 
eyewitness memory, cognition and language and language development. (R. at 66) 
Appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert Testimony on 
Eyewitness Identification on August 31, 1999. (R. 82-94) Appellant's Memorandum in 
support stated that "[t]he expert testimony that defendant seeks to admit to the Court at 
trial in this matter pertains to research and theory concerning memory, the reporting of 
memory, and the variables known to influence memory and memory reports. (R. at 83) 
Additionally, Appellant's Memorandum in Support proffered Dr. Dodd's expected 
testimony regarding the unreliability eyewitness identification testimony. (R. at 89-92) 
The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Intent to 
Rely on Expert Testimony. (R. 74) A hearing was held on the matter before the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder on September 2, 1999. (R. 240) At the hearing, Appellant 
requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of Dr. Dodd's 
testimony's foundational prinicples and techniques. In the alternative, Appellant argued 
that the trial court should admit the testimony under the rigors of State v. Rimmasch. 775 
P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) and Utah R. Evid. 702. Following the evidentiary hearing, Judge 
Hilder entered an Order denying Appellant's Motion on September 28, 1999. (R. 132 -
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135) Grounds for denial of said motion were as follows: 
First, the more complete consideration of the issues in both 
Long and 
subsequent cases suggest to this court that education of the jury 
is a 
judicial function, best accomplished through instruction, rather 
than one to be delegated to an expert who would, in fact, merely 
lecture the jury. Second, the Court is concerned that allowing an 
expert witness on the subject of reliabilty of eyewitness 
testimony would have a significant tendency to cause the jury 
to abdicate its role as fact finder, at least with respect to any 
issues that must be decided based on eyewitness testimony. 
(R. at 133-134); See Ruling on Appellant's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony regarding 
Eyewitness Identification at Addendum B) 
The trial court's conclusion that the use of a cautionary instruction is incorrect 
since the typical instruction, set forth in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 494 n.8 (Utah 1986) 
merely tells the jury things it might consider and that it is not to be considered as 
evidence. The use of a cautionary instruction does not fully address the concerns 
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification and does not provide a substitute for 
expert testimony. 
The trial court's conclusion that admitting expert testimony on eyewitness 
testimony would have a significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role as finder 
of fact is also incorrect. Expert testimony, even expert testimony which embraces an 
ultimate issue and is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 704, is admitted without the jury 
abdicating its role. See United States v. Langford. 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting)(pointing out that the rationale that expert testimony is 
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inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury "has been discredited and rejected 
by scholars, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court.")1 
Utah R. Evid. 702 and Utah case law provide a basis for admission of expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness identification. The trial court abused its discretion in 
disallowing Dr. Dodd's testimony. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It states, "[i]f 
scientific, techinical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible. 
State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah, 1997). That discretion must be exercised, 
however, within the framework of the three-part test articulation in State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d at 398-400, (Utah, 1989). That test requires the trial court to determine whether: 
1
 Regarding the rejection of the usurping the jury role rationale, Judge Ferguson 
elaborated: Dean Wigmore claimed that the jury function reasoning is a "mere bit of empty 
rhetoric." 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence Trials at Common Law Sec 1920, at 18 (J. Chadboum rev. ed. 
1978). The Federal Rules of Evidence have eliminated this rationale as a permissible objection 
to opinion evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a) ("[Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact."); see also United States v. Rogers. 769 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985). 
The Supreme Court rejected similar arguments in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899, 103 
S.Ct. 3383, 3397-98, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)("We are not persuaded that the fact finder and the 
adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its 
shortcomings"). Langford, 802 F.2d at 1183-84 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) 
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(1) "the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are 
inherently reliable," (State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996)); (2) "the scientific 
principles or techiniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular 
case by sufficiently qualified experts," (Id.); and (3) "the proffered scientific evidence 
will be more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." Id. (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8). The last consideration is based on 
the requirement of Utah R. Evid. 702 that the evidence assist the trier of fact, or in other 
words, that it be helpful. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. 
In its ruling, the trial court failed to explicitly state how Dr. Doddfs proffered 
testimony failed to meet the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 702 and Rimmasch. (R. at 132-
135) As noted above, the trial couifs discretion in determining whether expert testimony 
is admissible must be exercised within the framework of Rimmasch's three-part test. State 
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah, 1997); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398-400 
(Utah, 1989). This Court stated in State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah, 1996) that ". 
Rimmasch provides a detailed and rigorous outline for trial courts to follow when| 
making determinations concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence." citing 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 ("The trial court should carefully explore each logical link in 
the chain that leads to expert testimony given in court and determine its reliability.") Id. 
The record in the instant case fails to show whether the trial court followed the approach 
dictated by Rimmasch. Rather, a review of the record suggests that the trail court merely 
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accepted the State's argument that a cautionary instruction would best educate the jury, 
that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification would amount to nothing more 
than a lecture to the jury, and that allowing such expert testimony would have a tendency 
to cause the jury to abdicate its role of fact finder. (R. 78, 134) The trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to conduct an analysis under Rimmasch and Utah R.Evid. 702. 
Appellant submits that such an analysis was required by the trial court and further, that his 
proposed expert testimony is admissible under Utah case law and the rules. 
A. Expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is admissible under 
Rimmasch. 
Rimmasch first requires a threshold showing of inherent reliability. This can be 
done in two ways: (1) if the proponent can show that the evidence is generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific community, the trial court can take judicial notice of its reliability; 
or, (2) the proponent must lay an adequate foundation to demonstrate the inherent 
reliability of the underlying scientifice principles and techniques. Rimmasch 775 P. 2d at 
400; State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337 (Utah,1997) Appellant argued both the above points 
in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert Testimony on Eyewitness 
Identification (R. 84-85) and at the evidentiary hearing. (R. 240 at 6 -7) 
The trial court's order seems to indicate that the testimony Appellant sought to 
introduce would meet the threshold showing of inherent reliability. (R. 132- 133, 
Addendum C). The Judge wrote, ff[d]efendant appropriately argues that there are some 
problems inherent in eyewitness testimony, which view is fully supported by the Utah 
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Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1986)." (Id.) The order 
stated further, f,[w]hile the Maestas decision, and the arguments of counsel, both alert the 
Court to the possibility of allowing eyewitness testimony, this Court does not believe that 
such testimony is either required or advisable." (R. 133, Addendum C) The Court then 
went on to deny Appellant's motion for the reasons set forth above. (R. 133-134, 
Addendum C) 
The second part of the Rimmasch test was also met, and the trial court should have 
allowed Appellant's requested expert testimony. The record demonstrates that Appellant 
supplied adequate foundation for the proposed expert testimony. (See Notice of Intent to 
Rely on Expert Testimony which included Dr. Dodd's curriculum vitae, (R. 64-71); 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert Testimony on Eyewitness 
Identification (R. 82-94); Hearing on Motion to Allow Eyewitness Identification (R. 
240)) 
The last issue under Rimmasch before the trial court and this Court is whether the 
evidence would be helpful, i.e., whether the expert testimony would be more probative 
than prejudicial. See Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. 
In order to be "helpful", expert testimony must convey information which is n6t 
ordinarily within the knowledge of the average juror. See State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1155, 
1361 (Utah, 1993). 
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide 
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of 
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the average individual. Dixon [v. Stewart], 658 P.2d [591] at 
597 [(Utah, 1982)]. It is not necessary that the subject matter 
be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly 
understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a 
requirement that the subject be beyond the comprehension of each 
and every juror. See id. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. In other words, "'expert opinion is proper when it would help 
to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert 
and beyond the ken of the typical juror; " People v. Brooks. 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 
(N.Y., 1985) (further citations omitted) 
In Larsen, this Court held that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony in 
a securities fraud case "'because the technical nature of securities is not within the 
knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common experience and would 
help the jury understand the issues before them.'" Id (further citation omitted) Just as 
securities information is not average layman knowledge, correct information regarding 
the reliability of testimony is not within the knowledge of the average layman, as 
recognized by this Court in State v. Long. 721 P. 2d 483, 490 (Utah, 1986). 
Recognizing that jurors do not have accurate and complete information regarding 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have 
determined that expert testimony in this area "can provide significant assistance to the 
jury beyond that obtained through cross-examination and common sense." State v. 
Taylor. 749 P.2d 181, 184 (Wash. App. 1988) (citing inter alia United States v. Moors. 
786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985); 
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United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 
(Ariz. 1983); People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516 (Cal. 1985)(rev'd on other grounds, 107 
S.Ct. 837 (1987)); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); Brooks, 490 N.Y.S.2d 
692; State v. Buell 489 N.E. 2d 795 (Ohio 1986) 
California courts have fashioned a test for determining whether a trial court abused 
its discretion in excluding expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications: 
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key 
element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially 
corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and 
the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific 
psychological factors shown by the record that could have 
affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to 
be fully known or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be 
error to exclude that testimony. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d at 727. 
Washington courts also apply a similar test under which an abuse of discretion in 
excluding expert testimony occurs, "(1) where the identification of the defendant is the 
principal issue at trial; (2) the defendant presents an alibi defense; and (3) there is little or 
no other evidence linking the defendant to the crime." State v. Taylor, 749 P.2d 181, 184 
(Wash. App. 1988). 
In the present case, expert testimony would be "helpful" to the jury since 
identification is the central issue, there is no other evidence linking Appellant to the 
crime, the expert testimony related to factors which would have affected the accuracy of 
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the identification, and Appellant presented an alibi defense. 
Despite this Court's decisions in State v. Long.721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), State v. 
Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999) and State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), 
recognizing the fallibility of identification testimony and factors affecting the reliability 
of such testimony, as well as the "dramatic transformation" which has occurred in 
"[c]ourtsf treatments of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification . . . in the 
past twenty years" (United States v. Smithers. 212 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2000)), the 
decision of the trial court in the case at bar harkened back to two Utah cases decided 
almost twenty years ago to support its conclusion that expert testimony was not 
admissible. Although State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) (rev'd on other 
grounds, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)) and State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert identification testimony 
under the circumstances of those cases, both cases were decided prior to the significant 
shift and divergent analytical course which emerged in Long. That significant shift and 
divergent analytical course require that relevant expert testimony be admitted in cases 
where eyewitness identification is a central issue and no other evidence links the 
defendant to the crime. 
This Court's decisions in Long, Ramirez and Maestas were based on a review of 
the "empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identifications [ ]" 
(Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 779 (citing Long. 721 P.2d at 488); Maestas. 984 P.2d at 380) and 
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a determination that the unreliability of such evidence required an approach which 
diverged from prior practice. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. In Long, this Court reviewed the 
research regarding human memory and eyewitness identification, recognizing "humanl 
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and fallible." Long, 721 
P.2d at 488. Although the research shows that eyewitness identifications are often 
unreliable, "juries have a fundamental misunderstanding of the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications" and "because jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of such 
identifications, they often give eyewitness testimony undue weight." Maestas, 984 P.2d at 
380 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 490). 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, 
for the most part, unsware of these problems. People simply 
do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that 
certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory 
process of an honest eyewitness. Moreover, the common 
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to 
documented research findings. 
Id. 
The increased awareness as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification created by 
the studies referenced in Long, as well as the concern that jurors' common beliefs about 
the reliability of an identification may actually be contrary to the research findings that led 
this Court to reassess its approach to the use of cautionary eyewitness identification 
instructions. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Because of the risk that eyewitness testimony would 
be given undue weight by uninformed and misguided jurors, this Court concluded "that at 
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a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is 
warranted" and Mabandon[ed] [the] discretionary approach to cautionary jury instructions," 
instead directing that "trial courts shall give such an instruction whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case and such instruction is requested by the defense." 
Id.; see also Maestas, 984 P.2d at 380-81. 
The concerns about the fallibility of eyewitness identification expressed in Utah 
case law since the Griffin and Malmrose decisions as well as recent studies regarding the 
significant number of wrongful convictions which have been based on faulty eyewitness 
identification testimony (see Andrew R. Tillman, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness 
Identification: The Constitution Says, "Let the Experts Speak," 56 Tenn.L.Rev. 735, 726 
(1989); Gary L. wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological 
research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol. and the L. 765-791 
(1995))see also Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, October 1999) require 
that a trial judge take into account this Court's teachings and allow expert testimony 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony in cases where 
identification is a central issue. Not only is such evidence "helpful" to a jury, it is 
essential to a defendant's ability to present a defense since without such testimony, a jury's 
misconceptions rather than relevant evidence could determine the outcome. See, 
generally, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (a criminal defendant has the 
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right to present a defense). 
Utah is not unique in grappling with the transformation in case law which has 
occurred as our understanding of this area has increased. In Smithers. the Sixth Circuit 
conducted an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of case law in this area and held th^t 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to present expert 
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. In reaching that conclusion, the 
Smithers court noted that in the 1970's when lawyers began raising this issue, "courts 
were uniformly skeptical about admitting such testimony, elaborating a host of reasonjs 
why eyewitness experts should not be allowed to testify." Smithers, 212 F.2d at 311. By 
the 1980fs, the trend shifted toward allowing the use of eyewitness expert testimony. Id. 
(citing inter alia Moore. 786 F.2d at 1313; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232; Smith. 736 F.2d 
at 1107; Buell 489 N.E. 2d 795) In fact, "several courts have held that it is an abuse of 
discretion to exclude such expert testimony." Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Stevens} 
935 F.2d 1380, 1400-01 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith. 736 F.2d at 1107; Downing. 753 F.2d at 
1232; Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208) "This jurisprudential trend is not surprising in light of 
modern scientific studies which show that, while juries rely heavily on eyewitness 
testimony, it can be untrustworthy under certain circumstances." Id. 
Since the early 1980fs, a number of decisions have recognized the problems 
associated with eyewitness testimony which were acknowledged by this Court in Long, 
and have held that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit expert testimony 
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in light of those problems. See e.g. Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311; Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1400-
01; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232; Taylor, 749 P.2d at 184-185; McDonald, 690 P.2d at 
709; Chappie, 660 P.2d at 1218-23; see also Smith, 736 F.2d at 1103 (expert eyewitness 
identification testimony met "helpfulness" requirement and was improperly excluded); 
Brooks, 490 N. Y.2d at 702 (expert testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony is admissible). The trial judge abused his discretion is this case, 
where identification is the central issue, there is no other evidence other than the 
identification testimony linking Appellant to the crimes, Appellant presented an alibi 
defense, and the defense sought to have Dr. Dodd testify regarding factors which could 
have affected the reliability of the identifications. 
First, there is no question that identification is the central issue in this case. Other 
than Appellant's alibi, the only defense he had available at trial was the unreliability of the 
eyewitness identifications. 
Second, there is no other evidence, other than the eyewitness identifications, which 
would support Appellant's convictions. The record is entirely devoid of any physical 
evidence linking Appellant to the crimes. Appellant's fingerprints were not found in 
Gunderson's apartment. (R. 229 at 172) No evidence was presented regarding the gun 
used in the commission of these offenses. There was no evidence presented that Appellant 
was found in possession of any of the items stolen from Gunderson's apartment. There 
was no evidence presented showing that the clothing the eyewitnesses identified their 
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assailant wearing belonged to or was found in Appellant's possession. Although someone 
reported seeing a suspicious vehicle near Gunderson's apartment on the date in question, 
the police failed to follow up on that description in an effort to obtain the identity of the 
vehicle's owner. (R. 229 at 173) 
Third, the defense sought to present expert testimony which was relevant and 
material since it related to the factors which might have affected the reliability of the 
identifications in this case. This Court appears to have approved the use of expert 
testimony when it noted in State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d at 381, ff[c]ounsel did not present 
expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification." As in Maestas, 
none of the three identifications in the case at bar are impervious to attack under the 
criteria set forth in Long. 
Each of the witnesses had an inadequate opportunity to observe the robber: Moss 
testified that she was only in the robber's presence for three to five minutes (R. 227 at 47; 
R. 229 at 102); that she did not stare at the robber's face because she was afraid that he 
would shoot her if he thought that she could point him out, so she tried to avoid him (R. 
229 at 102); that she was about eight feet away from the robber when she saw him (R. 229 
at 87); and that she was "bawling her eyes out" during the incident. (R. 229 at 93) 
Gunderson testified that prior to the robber entering his home, he and his three friends and 
been smoking marijuana for three to four hours. (R. 227 at 22-23; R. 229 at 129) 
Gunderson testified that after he answered his door, the robber stepped in and shot him in 
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the leg. (R. 227 at 7-8; R. 229 at 131-32) Gunderson then lost his balance and fell down 
several stairs. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 132) Gunderson testified that after falling, the 
robber came down the stairs, picked Gunderson completely off the floor by his hair, and 
demanded the drugs, guns, and money hidden in Gunderson's apartment. (R. 227 at 11; R. 
229 at 133) Gunderson testified that the robber wore a stocking cap, and that he could 
only see from about an inch above the robber's eyebrow and down. (R. 227 at 31) Ayza 
Wells, ("Wells") one of Gunderson's friends who had also been smoking marijuana that 
night (R. 229 at 120, 124), testified that he was four to four and a half feet away from the 
robber when he saw him. (R. 229 at 119) Wells also testified that after looking into the 
robber's eyes, he did not look at him again because he did not want to have a confrontation 
with the robber. (R. 229 at 119) 
The record demonstrates that the identifications are unreliable under the Long 
criteria. Moss' statement that she was "bawling her eyes out" (R. 229 at 93) during the 
incident indicates that her identification was affected by fright during the incident. That 
she avoided the robber, afraid that he may shoot her if he thought she could identify him 
(R. 229 at 102) further supports the untrustworthiness of her identification. 
Gunderson's condition during the course of the robbery could not have allowed him 
to make and record an accurate identification. First, he was under the influence of 
marijuana when he first viewed the robber. Second, after being shot, his powers of 
observation were hindered not only by the affects of marijuana, but also by his very 
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significant physical injury. Third, Gunderson testified that the robber then picked him up 
by his hair, implying that Gunderson would have been looking at the floor, if anything, at 
this time, rather than the robber's face. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 133) 
Wells' eyewitness identification is unreliable under the Long factors as well. Like 
Gunderson, he was under the influence of marijuana which would significantly alter his 
ability to observe. Further, Well's testimony shows that directly after looking at the 
robber's eyes, he refused to look again at the robber, fearing a confrontation. (R. 229 at 
119) 
Finally, Moss' and Gunderson's identifications of Appellant at the robber were 
tainted by a highly suggestive photo array shown to them prior to their in-court 
identifications (see Argument at Point II, infra). 
As argued supra, however, the Long cautionary instruction given by the Court was 
insufficient to properly educate the jurors as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification. 
Dr. Dodd's testimony was essential to Appellant's defense, and the trial court's decision 
denying Appellant the right to present Dr. Dodd's testimony was an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II. INTRODUCTION OF THE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATIONS VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE L SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
State witnesses Moss and Gunderson both identified Appellant as the robber at trial, 
after viewing his photo in a photo array in February, 1999. The trial court admitted 
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evidence of the photo array identifications at trial and also admitted identifications by 
witnesses in court. The admission of this evidence violated Appellant's Due Process 
rights under both Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
A. Utah Constitutional Analysis: 
The court on appeal reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence of an 
eyewitness identification by reviewing the record evidence to determine from the totality 
of the circumstances whether the admission of the identifications is consistent with the due 
process guarantees of article I, section 7. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 
1991). 
In Ramirez, this Court held that "[F]or purposes of determining the due process 
reliability of eyewitness identifications under article I, section 7, we will not limit 
ourselves to an analytical model that merely copies the federal. We will require an in-
depth appraisal of the identification's reliability along the lines laid out by Long." 817 
P.2d at 780. 
Under the Utah constitutional analysis, the ultimate question to be determined is 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. State v. 
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781) 
Appellant submits that the witness1 identifications in the case at bar were unreliable and 
admitted at trial in violation of his constitutional rights. 
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Under Ramirez, there are five factors to be considered in making this 
determination: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness1 degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness' capacity 
to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness1 identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or 
whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 (citing State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)) 
In Ramirez, the defendant was stopped shortly after an aggravated robbery had 
occurred. Police handcuffed the defendant to a chain link fence at about 1:00 a.m. Shortly 
thereafter, witnesses from a robbery were transported to the arrest scene together. The 
police shined the headlights and spotlights from the police cars onto the defendant, and the 
witnesses viewed the defendant by looking at him from the back seat of the police car. 
The defendant was the only suspect present and was surrounded by police officers. Of the 
three witnesses, only one identified the defendant as the robber. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 775-
77. 
On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress the eyewitness identification. Analyzing the case under the five factors set forth 
above, this Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the identification, 
although the case was "extremely close." 817 P.2d at 784. 
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The case at bar is more than "extremely close." Application of the Ramirez 
reliability factors to the facts of this case supports a finding that the eyewitness 
identifications were unreliable and should have been suppressed. 
1. The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event. 
Both Moss and Gunderson had a limited opportunity to view the assailant during the 
events of January 24, 1999. Moss testified at trial that the length of time in which the 
robbery took place "couldn't have been more than five minutes . . . I'd say three to five 
minutes." (R. 229 at 102) She also testified that she was approximately eight feet away from 
the robber when she first saw him.(R. 229 at 87) Moss testified that once the robber saw 
her, he told her to lay down on the ground in the kitchen where he duct taped her arms 
behind her back. (R. 229 at 88 -89) Moss testified that "When he was there, I didn't get a 
really good look at him." (R. 229 at 100) Finally, Moss testified regarding her observation 
and identification of the robber that ". . .[T]he whole time I saw him, I only saw him from 
the left side. So it made it a little harder." (R. 229 at 112) Moss' testimony demonstrates 
that she only had a brief period of time in which to observe the robber and that she 
deliberately avoided looking at him. 
Although Gunderson may have had a very brief opportunity to view the robber when 
he answered the door, the events that transpired directly following the robber gaining 
entrance support a finding that Gunderson would have had a very limited time to observe 
his assailant. Specifically, Gunderson testified that the robber shot him in the leg after 
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Gunderson opened his door. (R. 227 at 7-8; R. 229 at 131-32) Gunderson then lost his 
balance and fell down ten to twelve stairs. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 132) Gunderson 
testified that the robber then picked him up by his hair, implying that Gunderson would 
have been looking at the floor, if anything, at this time, rather than the robber's face. (R. 
227 at 11; R. 229 at 133) Gunderson's testimony, coupled with that of Moss' testimony 
that the robber was in the apartment for only three to five minutes supports a finding that he 
had only a brief period of observation. 
2. The witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event. 
Moss and Gunderson's testimony strongly suggests that neither witness could have 
paid a high degree of attention to the robber, even if they had truly wanted to. Indeed, the 
record shows that Moss was bound by duct tape during most of the robbery, presumably 
laying on her stomach. (R. 229 at 88-89) She also testified that she was "bawling her eyes 
out,"during the course of the robbery, making it very unlikely that she was directing her 
attention to the robber. (R. 229 at 93) 
Review of the record also demonstrates a reasonable presumption that Gunderson 
was not paying much attention to the robber; particularly after being shot. It is reasonable 
to assume that Gunderson was distracted by his gunshot wound as well as by the unusual 
activity going on around him. 
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3. The witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity. 
This Court in Ramirez set out relevant circumstances to be considered in regard this 
factor. Those circumstances are "whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired 
by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or 
prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. 817 P.2d 
at 783. 
Applying the factors to the case at bar supports a finding of unreliability. The record 
indicates that both Moss and Gunderson suffered from a high degree of stress and fright at 
the time of the incident. This Court stated in Long, "[c]ontrary to much accepted lore, when 
an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to 
decrease significantly." 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) Gunderson's identification was 
additionally impaired by a combination of drugs and injury. 
Moss was obviously scared during the course of the robbery. She testified that she 
did not stare at the robber's face because she was afraid that he would shoot her if he 
thought that she could point him out, so she tried to avoid him (R. 229 at 102); and further 
that she was "bawling her eyes out" during the robbery. (R. 229 at 93) 
Gunderson's condition during the course of the robbery could not have allowed him 
to make and record an accurate identification. First, he was under the influence of 
marijuana when he first viewed the robber. Second, after being shot, his powers of 
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observation were hindered not only by the affects of marijuana, but also by his very 
significant physical injury. Third, Gunderson testified that the robber then picked him up 
by his hair, implying that Gunderson would have been looking at the floor, if anything, at 
this time, rather than the robber's face. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 133) 
Gunderson testified at the preliminary hearing that the robbery was "very 
traumatizing." (R. 227 at 28) Gunderson testified that he and his three friends and been 
smoking marijuana for three to four hours immediately before the robbery. (R. 227 at 22-
23; R. 229 at 129) When asked just how much marijuana he was smoking that day, 
Gunderson answered "Back then I generally smoked a lot on any given day." (R.229 at 
140) He testified further that he could not recall specifically how much marijuana that he 
had consumed that day, but that it was probably "three to four bowls." (Id.) The 
consumption of "a lot" of marijuana on January 24, 1999, as well as his daily consumption 
of the substance, undoubtedly compromised seriously Gunderson's mental capacity to 
observe. 
Gunderson's capacity to observe the robber was also impaired by his physical 
condition. Gunderson's bullet wound entered and exited between his knee and ankle on his 
left leg, shredding a main artery. (R. 227 at 9) Gunderson testified that "he was in so much 
shock from being shot.. ." (R. 229 at 140), and "I was deeply in shock." (R.229 at 141) 
After being shot, Gunderson then tumbled down the ten to twelve stairs which led upstairs 
to his front door. Gunderson's extremely poor physical condition at the time of the 
-31-
robbery had to have hampered his powers of observation. 
4. Whether the witness' identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion. 
This Court directs that relevant circumstances to consider under this factor include 
"the length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time of the event 
and the identification of the defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at 
the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, 
identifications, or other information from other sources; instances when the witness or 
other eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or 
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and 
the circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification." 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 783 (citing State v. Long. 721 P.2d at 494 n.8 (Utah 1986). 
A review of these circumstances weigh in favor of this Court finding that the 
eyewitness identifications in this case were unreliable. Although Gunderson gave a 
description of his assailant to the police the same night of the incident, he testified that at 
the time he gave the description, he "was either under the influence of drugs [prescribed for 
pain] or still very traumatized." (R. 227 at 34) Gunderson described the suspect as a 
medium to light skinned African American male, very tall, strong, having facial hair in the 
form of a goatee, wearing a baggy, dark coat, a beanie stocking cap that was either black or 
dark blue, gloves and carrying a silver or chrome semiautomatic gun. (R. 227 at 29-30, R. 
229atl32, 157) 
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As argued supra regarding Gunderson's mental state, he had been smoking 
marijuana for several hours and was probably still under the influence of marijuana as well. 
He also testified, "I was deeply in shock" directly following the shooting. (R.229 at 141) 
In addition to being both stoned and shocked simultaneously, Gunderson also seemed to be 
fixated on the weapon held by the robber. Gunderson testified, "I was too busy looking at 
thegun.. ." (R.229 at 157). 
Finally in relation to Gunderson, the circumstances under which Appellant was 
presented to him for identification are not to be depended on. The identification came 
some three weeks following the robbery. (R. 228 at 42-43, 45) Merino testified that he put 
together a photo array and showed it to Gunderson February 15, 1999. (R. 229 at 164) 
Gunderson testified at the preliminary hearing that he had been out of the hospital for five 
days to one week by the time Merino showed him the photo array and was still under the 
influence of pain killers. (R. 227 at 38-39) At trial, Gunderson testified that he viewed the 
photo array 2-3 days after his release from the hospital (229 at 144). Gunderson testified 
further that "I was under a lot of pain killers at the time. I mean, I was taking seven or 
eight pain killers a day, so my - - for the entire three, three and a half months after I got 
shot, it was a complete blur." (Id.) 
Moss also gave a description of the suspect to the police the same night as the 
robbery, however, like Gunderson, did not make her identification until February 15, 1999. 
(R. 227 at 47-48, 228 at 20-21). Moss' description of the robber is inconsistent with 
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Gunderson's description, given the same evening. Moss described the robber as wearing a 
green and black "Nike" jacket, levi's, a black ski cap, but no gloves. (R. 227 at 49, 229 at 
110) Moss also testified that the robber was holding a small, dark blue or black gun in his 
hand. (R. 229 at 84). As set forth above, Gunderson stated that the robber had facial hair 
and was wearing a dark baggy coat, gloves, and carrying a chrome or silver gun. (R. 227 at 
29-30, R. 229 atl32, 157). 
Moss's state of mind also indicates that her identification is unreliable. Moss1 
statement that she was "bawling her eyes out" (R. 229 at 93) during the incident indicates 
that her identification was affected by fright during the incident. That she avoided the 
robber, afraid that he may shoot her if he thought she could identify him (R. 229 at 102) 
further supports an inference that her ability to observe the robber was hampered by fear. 
Moss5 identification was additionally tainted by exposure to outside information 
prior to viewing the photo array on February 15, 1999 where she identified Appellant as 
the robber. Specifically, Moss testified that she discussed the identification of the robber 
with two of her neighbors, Johnny Gordon and Gilbert Ellis, shortly after the incident. (R. 
227 at 46 R. 229 at 96-97) She testified that the neighbors gave a description of the robber, 
and told her how that he was six feet, nine inches tall, and that they did not know his name, 
but that he went by the nickname "Six nine." (Id. at 46-47, R. 229 at 97) Moss then spoke 
with Merino, giving him the information conveyed to her by her neighbors. (R. 229 at 98) 
Finally, the circumstances under which Appellant was presented to Moss for 
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identification are not reliable. Merino conducted the photo array in Gunderson's apartment 
parking lot(R. 228 at 14, 229 at 168) Merino showed the photo line up to Gunderson first. 
(R. 229 at 168) Moss testified that she stood only ten feet away from Merino and 
Gunderson during this time.(R. 229 at 99) Gunderson testified that Moss stood about 
twenty feet away (R. 227 at 39), and Merino testified that she stood forty to fifty feet away 
while he showed the photos to Gunderson.(R. 228 at 16) Prior to showing Gunderson the 
photos, he told both witnesses that the suspect's picture may or may not be in the stack.(R. 
228 at 15) Moss testified that she was close enough to the two men while Merino was 
showing Gunderson the array to hear Gunderson say, "That's him" and, "I'm 10 on the 
scale." (R. 229 at 99) 
Moss' firsthand and personal knowledge that Gunderson had picked someone's 
picture out of the photo array makes her subsequent identification unreliable. Gunderson's 
identification, which Moss overheard, nullifies Merino's statements to her prior to showing 
her the photos which warned her that the suspect may or may not be included in the photo 
array.2 Gunderson's statements surely pressured her into picking one of the photos from 
the stack. Although she testified that "she couldn't see anybody else that even resembled 
[the assailant]" (R. 229 at 111) in the stack of photos, she picked one out anyway, 
identifying Appellant as the robber. 
2Merino testified at the Motion to Suppress hearing that he "[t]old her [Moss] that he may 
or may not be in there" (R. 228 at 20). 
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5. The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember, and relate it correctly. 
Ramirez instructs that relevant factors to be considered under this factor are whether 
the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, 
and whether the race of the actor's was the actor's race was the same as the observer's. 817 
P.2d at 781. As explained by this Court in Long, the significance of the event to the 
witness at the time of perception is important because people usually remember in some 
detail where they were when something out of the ordinary occurred, for example, when 
John F. Kennedy was assassinated. The Court went on to explain that those same people 
are less accurate in their descriptions of events that are not of particular importance at the 
time they are observed. 721 P.2d at 488. 
In Long, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person by the uncorroborated testimony of one 
eyewitness who viewed his attacker while he was crying and his vision was "glossy" for 
approximately six seconds during the course of being shot. 721 at 484. The victim did not 
identify the defendant in a photo array, but identified him at the preliminary hearing and at 
trial Id. In finding that it was improper for the trial court not to have given a cautionary 
instruction regarding eyewitness identification testimony, this Court noted that the 
circumstances surrounding the victim's identification of the defendant raised "grave 
concerns" as to its reliability. Id. Among the Court's concern's in Long was that "these 
identifications took place not in formal lineups, but in courtroom proceedings during which 
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Long was apparently the only black man present." Id. 
Long's facts are similar to the case at bar in that Wells' only identification of 
Appellant came at trial, when Appellant was the only black man present in the courtroom. 
The trial took place more than a year after the robbery occurred. (R. 229 at 126) The length 
of time between the crime and Wells' in-court identification of Appellant suggests that the 
identification is untrustworthy. In determining the reliability of Wells' identification, this 
Court should also consider that Wells had been smoking marijuana with Gunderson prior to 
the incident and therefore was under the influence of drugs (R. 229 at 120. 124), and that 
after looking the robber in the eyes, Wells refused to look at him again because he feared a 
confrontation (R. 229 at 119). Further, Merino never conducted an in-person lineup in this 
case, even though Appellant was in jail and accessible, thus relying only upon his photo 
array as a means of identifying the suspect. 
Whether the race of the actor's was the same as the observer's is important to the 
reliability of an identification because "identifications tend to be more accurate where the 
person observing and the one being observed are of the same race." Long, 721 P.2d at 489 
(citing Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator 
Variables. 36 J. Personality & Social Psych. 1546, 1550 (1978); Note, Cross Racial 
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases. 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984); J. Bibicoff, Seeing 
is Believing? The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions of the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony. 11 San Fernando Valley L. Rev. 95 (1983). 
-37-
The witnesses in this case identified the robber as a "black man." (R. 228 at 7). 
Appellant is an African American. This Court has recognized that identifications tend to be 
inaccurate when the witness and the actor are of different races. 
The eyewitness identifications in the case at bar are unreliable under the totality of 
the circumstances and application of the above Ramirez factors. The trial court violated 
Appellant's rights to due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
B: Federal Constitutional Analysis: 
The trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress the Photo Array 
Identification and In-Court Identifications violated Appellants federal constitutional rights 
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
photo array presented to the witnesses was impermissibly suggestive under the federal due 
process clause because the witnesses' attention was improperly focused on Appellant's 
photograph. 
This Court has said, "[u]nder federal due process, any photo array may be 
scrutinized to determine whether it was so impermissibly suggestive that it undermines our 
confidence in any subsequent in-court eyewitness identification." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
1105, 1110-11 (Utah 1994)(citing State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432,435 (Utah 1989). A two 
part test is applied in determining whether the photo array was so suggestive that admission 
of eyewitness testimony in trial violated defendant's federal due process rights. The first 
part of the test requires the court to determine whether the "pretrial photographic 
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identification procedure used . . . was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. The second part of the test 
dictates that if the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, any in-court identification 
"must be based on [an] untainted, independent foundation to be reliable." Id. 
The main question under the first part of the test is "whether the photo array 
emphasized the defendant's photo over the others." Id. Factors to be considered in this 
evaluation are whether the words and body language of the police officer presenting the 
array conveyed an attitude of disinterest, whether the officers manipulated the photos to 
indicate their belief that one of the photos portrayed the perpetrator, and whether the photos 
themselves were selected so that the defendant's stood out from the others. Id. 
The record supports a finding that the photo array emphasized Appellant's photo 
over the others. Significantly, Merino obtained Appellant's mug shot based on hearsay and 
unreliable information obtained from Gunderson regarding the nick name "Six Nine". 
Furthermore, Appellant's photo stands out among the others in the array because it is the 
only photo resembling the witnesses' description of the suspect. (See Photo Array in 
Addendum C) 
First, Moss gave Merino hearsay information Moss had obtained from two of her 
neighbors. Moss testified that she discussed that she discussed the identification of the 
robber with two of her neighbors, Johnny Gordon and Gilbert Ellis, shortly after the 
incident. (R. 227 at 46 R. 229 at 96-97) She testified that the neighbors gave a description 
-39-
of the robber, and told her how that he was six feet, nine inches tall, and that they did not 
know his name, but that he went by the nickname "Six nine". (Id. at 46-47, R. 229 at 97) 
Moss then spoke with Merino, telling him the nickname of the suspect given to her by the 
neighbors. (R. 229 at 98) 
Second, Gunderson also told Merino that he thought the suspect went by the name 
"Six Nine," because when he went to answer his door on January 24, 1999, he first asked 
who was there. Gunderson said that the reply was "Six Nine." (R. 228 at 9) Gunderson's 
descriptions of the suspect are unreliable, for the reasons set forth in Point I, supra. 
Based on this information, and thinking that the suspect "was possibly in the Salt 
Lake County Jail at that time," Merino called the jail to find out whether they did indeed 
have anyone in jail by that nick name. (R. 228 at 9) The jail informed his that they did. (R. 
228 at 9) Merino then got a mug shot of the person with the nick name, and this mug shot 
turned out to be Appellant's photograph. (R. 228 at 10) Merino testified that he had 
specifically picked out Appellant's picture as his suspect because he was a person having 
the nick name "Six Nine", according to the Salt Lake County Jail. (R. 228 at 35-36) 
Merino then began assembling a photo array, centered around Appellant's photograph (R. 
228 at 11), even though he has no formal training in assembling and/or conducting a photo 
array.3 
3Merino testified that his employer, the Salt Lake City Police Department has no written 
policy advising officers how to conduct a photo line-up, that there is nothing in the Department 
in writing which instructs officers what to say to witnesses involved in a photo line-up, and that 
he had received no formal training on conducting photo line-ups. (R. 228 at 25-26) 
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Merino selected the photos to be included in the array only from a pool of seventy-
five photos which he obtained from the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 228 at 12, 39), even 
though he had thousands of photos available to him through the Sheriffs Office data bank. 
(R. 228 at 38) He testified that he was looking for photos which would be comparable to 
Appellant's photograph. (R. 228 at 36) (See Photo Array in Addendum C) 
Before Merino obtained Appellant's mug shot from the jail, he obtained descriptions 
of the suspect from witnesses Moss and Gunderson which he characterized as "roughly the 
same." (R. 228 at 10) The descriptions were different in an important respect, however. 
While Gunderson's description of the suspect included a "slight mustache and a goatee," 
(R. 228 at 7) Moss gave no information to Merino regarding facial hair on the suspect, 
indicating that she believed the suspect had none. (R. 228 at 32) Additionally, neither 
witness gave Merino any specific description of the suspect's face. (R. 228 at 31-32) Other 
than Gunderson's description of the suspect's facial hair, Merino's only other information 
regarding the description of the suspect's facial characteristics on which to rely was 
Gunderson's statement that the suspect was "black" and that his skin tone was "medium". 
(R. 228 at 7, 35) With regard to the suspect's other features, Gunderson described him as 
very tall, estimating his height to be six feet nine inches and muscular. (R. 228 at 7) 
Merino testified that his employer, the Salt Lake City Police Department has no 
written policy advising officers how to conduct a photo line-up, that there is nothing in the 
Department in writing which instructs officers what to say to witnesses involved in a photo 
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line-up, and that he had received no formal training on conducting photo line-ups. (R. 228 
at 25-26) 
The photos Merino included in the photo array drew the witnesses attention to 
Appellant's photo. (See Addendum C) In fact, the witnesses could have picked Appellant's 
photo simply by a process of elimination based on the descriptions given to Merino. 
Gunderson described the suspect as a medium-complected African American male. (R. 228 
at 35) The only person meeting that description in the array is Appellant. Merino himself 
agreed that exhibits one, two and five depict African American males with much darker 
skin than Appellant. (R. 228 at 37) The witnesses could eliminate three of the photos, then, 
right away. Merino also agreed that exhibit number four depicted a very light complected 
man who could possibly pass as Hispanic. (R. 228 at 34) The witnesses could then 
eliminate a fourth photograph on the basis of ethnicity. Last, Merino seemed to agree that 
the person depicted in exhibit five could be identified as looking Tongan or Samoan.4 The 
witnesses could then eliminate the fifth photo, leaving only the photo of Appellant to be 
identified at the suspect. 
The same argument can be made regarding Gunderson's description of the suspect 
as having a "slight mustache and a goatee" (R. 228 at 7), and Moss' description of the 
testimony regarding exhibit five on Cross Examination on the Motion to Suppress was 
as follows: 
Q. Could you also identify that person as looking Tongan or Somoan? 
A. There is often a description confusion between black and Polynesian. 
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suspect of having no facial hair. (R. 228 at 32) Gunderson could have eliminated all of the 
photos, except Appellant's, on the basis of their skin tone and on the basis of their facial 
hair. None of the five other photos in the array have what could be described as a "slight 
mustache." (See Addendum C) Elimination of the five photos of the men with thick beards 
or substantial mustaches and goatees left only the Appellant's photo as the suspect. 
Finally, the manner in which Merino presented the photo array to the witnesses 
support a finding that it was impermissibly suggestive. (See Argument supra at Point 
1(A)(4)) 
The record demonstrates that the photo array as assembled and presented to the 
witnesses in this case was impermissibly suggestive. The admission of the photo array 
identifications as well as the admission of the witnesses in-court identifications violated 
Appellant's federal due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution. The error is reversible, and this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
RIGHTS BY CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT 
Jury selection in this case was held January 18, 2000. Appellant sat with defense 
counsel at counsel table. During much of the voir dire process, the trial court conducted 
individual voir dire at side bar, off the record, without the Appellant present and without 
waiver by the Appellant of his right to be present.(R. 229 at31-50, 62) 
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Specifically, the trial court began the voir dire by telling prospective jurors that "the 
Court is going to ask some questions, some individually, some collectively. Listen 
carefully to the questions. If any question invites an answer, identify yourself by name for 
the record and then respond solely to the question that's asked." (R. 229 at 7) The trial 
court then proceeded to ask each juror individually questions relating to their employment, 
marital status and educational background. (R. 229 at 8-24) The court then asked questions 
to the panel "collectively." (R.229 at 24) When the court asked the question, "Are any of 
you acquainted more than just casually with anyone who is in law enforcement?", a juror 
raised his hand and stated that his daughter's roommate was a Salt Lake County Sheriff and 
that he discussed her work with her often.(R. 229 at30-31) The court then asked, "As a 
result of those discussions have you formed an attitude or an idea or a philosophy or 
anything else that relates to law enforcement?" (R. 229 at 31) The juror answered, "Yes," 
and the trial judge invited him to the bench, where a discussion between the trial judge, the 
juror, the prosecutor and the defense attorney was conducted off the record. (Id.) Although 
Appellant remained at counsel table during this discussion and those which followed, there 
is no indication in the record that he freely and voluntarily waived his right to presence. 
The trial judge conducted a total of 10 such discussions with nine different prospective 
jurors (one juror approached the bench twice) during voir dire. (R. 229 at 31-32, 35, 40, 41-
42, 44-45, 50) Though off the record, each question solicited an answer which related to 
that juror's bias. (Id.) The questions asked immediately prior to each side-bar conference 
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indicate that the discussions focused on whether individual jurors' would be able to remain 
objective despite their relationships with people who work in law enforcement (R. 229 at 
31-32, 35), personal experiences of arrest or relationships with immediate family members 
who had been arrested (R. 229 at 40-42), and personal experience as a victim of crime and 
relationships with immediate family members who had been a victim of a crime. (R. 229 at 
43-45, 50) The trial judge openly invited anyone who wanted, to discuss matters 
"personally with the Court at the bench or do you want to discuss it on the record?" (R. 229 
at 39-40) 
A defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to be present at all stages of the 
trial. Utah Const, art I, section 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1953); See also, State of Utah 
v. Houtz. 714 
P.2d 677 (Utah 1986). This Court has stated that the defendant may waive his or her 
constitutional 
right to presence only if the waiver is voluntary. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. Further, 
voluntariness of 
defendant's waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. Id- In State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 
990, 992 (Utah 1982) this Court acknowledged that a defendant's "right to be present is 
conceded and guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States." This Court also noted that a defendant's right to presence is not 
absolute, but may be waived by word or act of the person claiming the right. Id. 
In Houtz, the defendant's trial was scheduled to start February 26, 1985. The 
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defendant failed to appear and the court continued the trial until the next morning. The 
defendant did not appear the next morning and the prosecutor advised the court that the 
defendant was in custody in a different state. The trial court denied defense counsel's 
request for another continuance, saying that the defendant had voluntarily chosen to absent 
himself from the trial. The trial proceeded without the defendant and he was convicted. 
This Court reversed and remanded the case noting that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in not continuing the trial until the defendant could be present. 
While there is no case law in Utah bearing directly on the issue of whether side-bar 
voir dire, conducted outside the presence of the defendant violated his statutory and 
constitutional rights, courts in New York, North Carolina and West Virginia have ruled on 
nearly identical issues. 
In State v. Antommarchi. 604 N.E.2d 95 (Court of Appeals of New York, 1992) the 
trial judge invited prospective jurors to the bench during voir dire to speak about issues 
they did not want to discuss publicly. These discussions were held on the record, with 
counsel, but outside the presence of the defendant. The defendant appealed his conviction, 
arguing that the trial court violated his right to be present during a material part of the trial 
when it allowed potential jurors to approach the bench and discuss voir dire questions 
outside the presence of the defendant. The Court of Appeals of New York agreed, and 
reversed Antommarchi's conviction. The Court noted that "[a] court may conduct side-bar 
discussions with prospective jurors in a defendant's absence if the questions relate to juror 
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qualifications such as physical impairments, family obligations and work commitments, " 
604 N. E. 2d at 97. The court held, however, that a trial court may not "explore 
prospective jurors' backgrounds and their ability to weigh the evidence objectively unless 
defendant is present." Id. The Court found further that defendant's failure to object to his 
exclusion from the side-bar conferences was not fatal to his claim on appeal because of his 
statutorily guaranteed "fundamental right to be present." Id. 
In State of North Carolina v. Johnston. 417 S. E. 2d 228 (North Carolina, 1991), co-
defendants were convicted of first degree murder. One defendant was sentenced to death 
and the other was sentenced to life imprisonment. Among other issues argued on appeal, 
the defendants argued that the trial court erred in conducting private bench discussions with 
prospective jurors in the absence of the defendants, their attorneys and a court reporter. 
The Court agreed, holding that the confrontation clause of the Constitution of North 
Carolina guaranteed the defendants' right to presence at every stage of the trial. 417 S. E. 
2d at 232. The Court also said that because the record did not include the substance of the 
private discussions, "we are unable to engage in the proper analysis to determine whether 
the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we must conclude that the 
State has failed to carry its burden, and we cannot say that the trial court's errors were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 417 S. E. 2d at 232-233. 
In State of West Virginia v. Hamilton. 403 S. E. 2d 739 (Supreme Court of Appeals 
of West Virginia, 1991), the defendant appealed his conviction arguing among other issues 
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that the trial court erred by conducting jury selection in his complete absence and without 
his waiver of his right to be present. The Court held that a defendant indicted for a felony 
has a statutory and Constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding. 403 S. E. 2d at 740-42) The Court also held that Rule 43(a) of the West 
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure guaranteed a defendant's right to presence. 403 S. E. 
2d at 742. 
In its discussion of the case, the Hamilton Court noted that when a defendant is 
absent from a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, the Constitution requires the State "to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless." Id. 
Citing State v. Bovd. 233 S. E. 2d 710, 719 (W. Va. 1977) The Court also noted that the 
lack of a record indicating what transpired during the absence of the defendant creates a 
possibility of prejudice, rendering "it impossible for the state to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless." Id. The State argued on appeal 
that the defendant's failure to object to the issue of his right to presence until the appellate 
stage constituted a waiver of such right. 403 S. E. 2d at 743. The Court rejected the State's 
argument, stating that although waiver by the defendant of his fundamental and 
constitutional right to be present at every stage of the proceedings could be accomplished, it 
must be achieved "by the defendant himself in the form of a knowing and intelligent 
waiver." Id. The Court found no such waiver and stated that a defendant's right to presence 
"is constitutional in nature and fundamental to the defendant's right to a fair trial. It cannot 
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be waived by someone other than the defendant and cannot be considered waived by failure 
to raise the issue until the appellate stage." Id. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona has also addressed the issue of a defendant's right to 
be present at every stage of a criminal proceeding. In Arizona v. McCrimmon, 927 P.2d 
1298, (Arizona, 1996) The Court reversed the two defendants' convictions and remanded 
on other grounds. Although they did not reach the defendants' specific right to presence 
issue, the Court issued a "Cautionary Note Concerning Proceedings in the Absence of 
Defendants in Criminal Cases," 927 P.2d at 1300. The Court warned trial courts and 
counsel "that proceedings in criminal cases held outside the defendant's presence are 
fraught with danger and should be conducted, if at all, only for valid reasons and only 
where the record clearly shows that the defendant waived his right to be present." Id. 
Defense counsel failed to object to the trial court's conduct on voir dire. Although 
this issue was not raised before the trial court, this Court should consider this issue on 
appeal because Appellant did not voluntarily waive his right to presence. See State v. 
Glenny, 656 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982) Furthermore, a defendant's right to presence "is 
constitutional in nature and fundamental to the defendant's right to a fair trial. It cannot be 
waived by someone other than the defendant and cannot be considered waived by failure to 
raise the issue until the appellate stage." 
State of West Virginia v. Hamilton, 403 S. E. 2d 739, 743 (W. Va., 1991) 
This Court may also this issue on appeal because the trial court committed plain 
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error. State v. Harrison. P.2d (slip opinion at paragraph 15) (Utah 2001). See 
also State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Deli. 861 P.2d431 (Utah 1993). 
This Court has set forth a two-step test for application of the plain error doctrine on 
appeal. See State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336; State v. Eldridge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
First, the error must be "plain," meaning that "from our examination of the record, we must 
be able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error." 
Braun 787 P.2d at 1341 (citing Eldridge. 773 P.2d at 35). Second, the error must affect the 
"substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful." Id. The policy underlying 
the plain error rule is to allow the court to reach justice in any given case and avoid 
injustice. Braun, 787 P.2d at 1341-42). 
The Court of Appeals noted in Braun. "that the two plain error requirements of 
obviousness and harmfulness are related and that the obviousness requirement poses no 
rigid and insurmountable barrier to review. For example, the more harmful an error is, the 
more likely an appellate court is to conclude that it was objectively obvious," 787 P.2d at 
1342. Appellant submits that the trial court's error in conducting individual voir dire and 
side bar and off the record was both obvious and harmful making this issue proper for 
judicial review. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Appellant's pre-trial 
motions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification and 
regarding suppression of the photo array identifications and in-court identifications of 
defendant. The trial court also erred in engaging in conversations with prospective jurors at 
the bench, outside the presence of the Appellant, when Appellant did not waive his right to 
be present. Appellant respectfully asks this court to reverse his convictions and remand for 
a new trial. 
DATED this fy*H day of May, 2001. 
( Atrorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing was mailed/hand 
delivered on this *]fa\ day of May, 2001 to: 
J. Frederic Voros 
Assistant Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Deputy District Attorneys Office 
231 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XTV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec* 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence agsdnst himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
f iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record-involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant, 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
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(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
Hon; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to h?ve "mnuSo^ 
Addendum B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : RULING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 991903649 
vs. : 
DARRYL HUBBARD, : 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to Allow Eyewitness Expert Testimony came 
before the Court for hearing on September 22, 1999. John K. 
Johnson, Deputy District Attorney, appeared for the State, and 
Stephanie Ames, Salt Lake Legal Defenders, appeared for defendant. 
The Court, having reviewed the Memorandum submitted by the parties, 
having heard arguments of counsel, and also having allowed 
additional time for briefing after the hearing, and now being fully 
advised, rules as follows: 
Defendant's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony regarding the 
issue of eyewitness identification is DENIED. Defendant 
appropriately argues that there are some problems inherent in 
eyewitness testimony, which view is fully supported by the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 
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1986) . In Long, however, the court determined that the problems 
could be addressed through an appropriately crafted jury 
instruction. Subsequent to Long/ Utah courts have routinely given 
an instruction based upon Long when requested by the defendant. 
The defendant points to the decision in State v. Maestas, 367 
Utah Adv.Rep. 15 (Utah, April 9, L999) , in support of the argument 
that the Court should allow expert testimony, in addition to a 
cautionary instruction. The Maestas case was decided on the issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is true that the court 
mentioned that "Counsel did not present expert testimony regarding 
the unreliability of eyewitness identification." Id. at 18. This 
statement alone, however, which was not part of the holding of the 
court, does not require this Court to allow expert testimony. The 
only holding expressly stated by the Maestas court was that 
"counsel's failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction 
rendered his performance constitutionally deficient." Id. at 19. 
While the Maestas decision, and the arguments of counsel, 
both alert the Court to the possibility of allowing eyewitness 
testimony, this Court does not believe that such testimony is 
either required or advisable. First, the more complete 
consideration of the issues in both Long and subsequent cases 
STATE V. HUBBARD PAGE 3 RULING 
suggest to this Court that education of the jury is a judicial 
function, best accomplished through instruction, rather than one to 
be delegated to an expert who would, in fact, merely lecture the 
jury. Second, the Court is concerned that allowing an expert 
witness on the subject of reliability of eyewitness testimony would 
have a significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role 
as fact finder, at least with respect to any issues that must be 
decided based on eyewitness testimony. 
For the foregoing reasons, as earlier stated, the Motion is 
denied. This signed ruling shall be the Order of the Court, and no 
further Order is required. 
Dated this J2ft Iday of September, 1999. 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
DISTRICT COURT JUU 
I3H 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this day of September, 
1999: 
John K. Johnson 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephanie Ames 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY - 2149 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6474 
MAfi
 2 2 2001 
IEW30PH6ME C 0 W ,T 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DARRYL HUBBARD, 
Defendant. 
VERIFICATION OF PHOTO 
ARRAY EXHIBIT 
Case No. 20000233SC 
Lower Court No. 991903649 FS 
The undersigned, Detective Carl G. Merino, Salt Lake City Police Department, was 
assigned to work on the above-entitled case. During the course of the investigation 
Detective Merino showed the attached photographic array labeled Exhibit(s)/~ & to the 
robbery eyewitnesses. The same exhibit was introduced into evidence at trial. 
DATED this 13 day of March, 2001, 
) 
CARX G\ MERINO 
Detective Salt Lake City Police 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Sa*t Lake ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this l 3 day of March, 2001. 
f" "^XT™ ™" """Notary Public I 
^ ^ KETURAMA^VITT i 
Residing at: I 
KCTUBAMAWMTT . 
10WtttBiMdwSuJi«0 1
SaHUto City, Utah 14101 . 
MyCommiMionExpifW I 
^0*05*17.2004 
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My Commission Expires: 
EXHIBIT 1 
SHERIFF 
RPVHOND 
COLEHfiN 
Booking** 9410077 
SO. #: 0181444 
Height 510 
Weight; 140 
Sex: MALE 
Race BLfiCK 
)B 07 / 30 / 
Uate 60394 
Nfl
7 / 3 0 / 69 
«**»-. 
EXHIBIT 2 
HliL^f 
JEFFERV 
PDDTCD 
WFil H Hi 
mtfGjmm\ 
^? 
rUK1hK 
Bookmg#: 9829739 
5.0. #: 
Height: 
Weight: 
Sex: 
Race: 
DOB: 
Date 
0151597 
607 
220 
HfiLE 
BLfiCK 
01 / 0 7 / 68 
122498 
EXHIBIT 3 
EXHIBIT 4 
isgi 
WILBERT 
BRVRNT 
Bookmg# 
SO. #: 
Height: 
Ueight 
Sex: 
R-^ ce: 
R: 
USUI 
V 
9524204 
0188792 
600 
250 
HfiLE 
BLRCK 
0 5 / 2 9 / 62 
;11695 
w 
EXHIBIT 5 
DRNNV 
PORKER 
Booking* 9602657 
SO. #: 
Height: 
Weight 
Sex 
Race 
DOB 
Date 
0204759 
602 
300 
HOLE 
BLRCK 
12 / 15 / 76 
20396 
mz9 f w 
t^t 
EXHIBIT 6 
